Zero Page 5

  In May of 1941 several units of Type 96 and Type 1 twin-engined bombers returned to China to resume heavy bombing operations, which augmented the marauding raids of the Zero fighters. On May 20, unable to ferret out Chinese fighters over Chengtu, the Zeros strafed and set afire fuel storage installations and destroyed two planes on the Taipingssu and Shuanglin airfields.

  This strafing raid, however, marked the end of the incredible good fortune of the Zeros against enemy opposi­tion. Antiaircraft fire riddled Chief Flight Petty Officer Kimura’s airplane, which subsequently crashed; this was the first Zero lost in combat. Three other fighters sustained damage from enemy ground fire that day.

  On May 22 nineteen Zeros attacked Chengtu, shooting down two enemy planes and burning ten on the ground in strafing attacks. Five Zeros were damaged. Nancheng was visited next; on May 26, nine Zeros destroyed five out of twenty Chinese fighters in aerial combat, and then burned eighteen additional planes in strafing runs. Twenty Zeros raided Lanchow on the twenty-seventh, but failed to arouse the enemy pilots; they burned two planes on the ground. On June 7 four Zeros caught two Chinese fighters over Chungking, blasting one from the air. Twenty-two Zeros made the biggest attack in months on the eighteenth against Lanchow, but failed to encounter enemy planes. They strafed and burned two planes, and suffered damage to two Zeros. On the twenty-second, nine of our fighters raided Chengtu, burning one plane and damaging another in a low-level sweep.

  On the same day, six Zeros swept over Kanyuan, catch­ing at least an equal number of Chinese fighters in the air, and destroying three of these. Later that afternoon the day’s third long-range patrol raided Tienshui; seven Zeros shot down one enemy plane. On the twenty-third six Zeros strafed Ipin, burning two and damaging five additional planes.

  We lost our second Zero later in the day on the twenty-third. Three fighters escorting two Type 98 reconnaissance planes on a low-altitude flight between Lanchow and Yuncheng were caught suddenly by a heavy antiaircraft barrage, causing pilot Kobayashi’s Zero to crash. Subse­quently, for more than two weeks, our fighters searched in vain for enemy planes. The Chinese refused to give battle.

  On August 11, however, sixteen Zeros escorting seven Type 1 bombers over Chengtu swarmed over a large group of Chinese fighters which for the first time in weeks opposed our bombers. Three enemy planes flamed before the Zeros’ cannon, and the bombers destroyed two others. The attack proved successful; the bomber raid against enemy airfields destroyed seven planes on the ground, and damaged an additional nine.

  On August 31 the Zeros embarked on their most diffi­cult and also their final mission of the war in China. Their target was Sungfan, China’s northwesternmost stronghold, which lay some five hundred nautical miles west of our Yuncheng base. Towering mountain ranges of twenty-three thousand feet jutted into the ever-present clouds along the route which our planes must follow. Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese Incident, Sungfan had been attacked but once, when on June 23 Mihoro Air Corps bombers raided the stronghold.

  Two Type 98 land-based reconnaissance planes led five Zero fighters, each flown by one of our best pilots in China, against the distant target. The planes met the expected heavy cloud cover and managed to maintain for­mation by flying at different heights where clearer air beckoned. Finally the cloud masses almost completely filled the visible sky, forcing the seven airplanes to turn back. The Zero’s role in China was completed.

  From early 1941 to September of the same year, Zeros flew 354 sorties, during which they shot down forty-five enemy planes and damaged sixty-two. During this same period we lost two fighters to anti-aircraft guns, while twenty-six suffered damage both from enemy planes and from ground fire.

  The battle score for the Zeros in all engagements on the Chinese mainland totaled seventy attacks against enemy targets, during which an aggregate of 529 fighters partici­pated. They shot down ninety-nine planes, and probably shot down four others, while damaging an additional 163 planes. Thirty-nine Zeros sustained damage, and enemy ground fire destroyed two.

  The largest single attack was a raid by thirty fighters on May 20, 1941, against Chengtu. Zero fighter groups received five Letters of Commendation from the Comman­der in Chief of the China Area Fleet, awarded for meritori­ous accomplishments in the missions against Chungking on September 13, 1940; against Chengtu on October 4 and December 30, 1940; against Chengtu on March 14, 1941; and against Nancheng on May 26, 1941.

  By March of 1941 the land-based attack bomber groups which had returned to Japan for reorganization were ready for new assignments. In early April the Genzan and Mihoro Air Corps of the newly organized 22nd Air Flotilla returned to central and north China. They were joined in late July by the Kanoya and the 1st Air Corps of the 21st Air Flotilla, and by the Takao Air Corps of the 23rd Air Flotilla. Escorted by Zero fighters, these bombers repeatedly attacked the cities of Chengtu, Chungking, and Lanchow. The Navy ordered the 3rd Air Corps of the 23rd Air Flotilla to northern French Indochina, from which the bombers raided Kunming.

  In late August and early September of 1941, their mis­sions accomplished, the China-based bombers reported to new stations in both Japan and Formosa. During their sec­ond combat tour of four months, we placed twenty-six hundred bombers over enemy targets. Of this number, we lost only one bomber, and that airplane fell to enemy anti-aircraft fire. In the dozens of raids which the bombers car­ried out, they encountered only ten Chinese fighter planes which managed to slip past the escorting Zero fighters. Even so, the enemy fighter planes failed to destroy any of our planes.

  These facts clearly demonstrate the Zero’s effectiveness in the China campaign. Where once we had reached the point of prohibitive bomber losses to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft, the arrival of the Zeros entirely destroyed the enemy planes’ effectiveness as intercepters. In summation, the Zero gave us undisputed command of the air over both our own territory and that of the enemy.

  By now, of course, we recognized the imminent possi­bility of a major war in the Pacific. The Navy completely reorganized its combat forces and alerted all units for pos­sible immediate war. We intensified our training program, concentrating on those tactics most likely to be needed in a war of major scope. The long combat missions in China proved of immense value in reforming our frontline groups, for in Asia we had flown both day and night mis­sions with large formations; coordinated closely operations between our escort fighters, attack bombers, and recon­naissance planes; improved our planes as dictated by the lessons of battle; effected fighter sweeps; and increased greatly the efficiency of our bombers and fighters. We felt that even with the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean as the next area of battle, the lessons we had learned from com­bat in China would prove their value.

  By late November of 1941, with the special three months’ period of intensive training completed, all the Navy’s air units were fully prepared for battle, confident in their men, their planes, and their ground-support groups.

  War however, is seldom a one-sided affair. Despite our brilliant successes in China, we felt uneasy about a mass conflict with the United States and England. The vast strength of those two powers destroyed any basis for opti­mism. We knew that in a war against those two nations we would face an array of weapons terrifying both in quality and in quantity.

  It must be admitted that this appraisal of a potential conflict with America and England was made only by few people within the Navy. The vast majority of our airmen, experienced only in combat against the Chinese, or basing their conclusions on reports of the China Incident, could only visualize victory against any possible opponent.

  CHAPTER 5

  Opening of Hostilities Followed by Anxiety

  AT MIDNIGHT TODAY, the eighth of December, our Army and Navy have opened hostilities with American and British forces.”

  This totally unexpected broadcast on the early morning of December 8, 1941, struck the Japanese people like a thunderbolt. Bewilderment and open disbelief greeted the words of the announcer. It
was true, of course, that the populace realized that diplomatic relations between their country and the United States were strained. The political maneuverings of the two countries since the summer of 1940 had been clouded by uncertainty and oppressiveness, partly due to the American government’s freezing of Japanese assets in the United States and to the sudden sus­pension of the commercial treaty between the two nations.

  The public had little understanding of the actual deteri­oration of international relationships, and found it difficult to accept an announcement of total war. However, the subsequent broadcast of the Imperial Rescript of the declaration of war left little doubt. The Japanese people soon con­cerned themselves with domestic adjustment as their nation plunged into war with two of the world’s greatest powers.

  Our people faced an enigmatic situation. They had been led into war with little preparation for an impending major conflict. Despite national pride, no one could deny the awesome combined strength of the United States and Great Britain. The great majority of our people tried, anxiously and unsuccessfully, to evaluate their situation. Their desire to criticize bitterly the autocratic government which without warning had swept the nation into war was countered by the tendency to place full support behind that govern­ment in the hope that the war had been undertaken with some plan for avoiding any physical destruction to the homeland. Only time would provide the answer.

  On December 8 I (Okumiya) was air staff officer of the 11th Combined Air Flotilla with headquarters at Kasumi­gaura, in charge of training the pilots and other air crew members for the Navy. The sudden announcement of war complicated enormously my training program which, I realized, would soon require considerable expansion.

  The experience of the Sino-Japanese Incident, and the recently completed three-month period of intensive flight training, meant that the Navy was well prepared to engage in “limited operations” with the enemy. However, our expe­rience in large-scale conflict was insufficient for us to hold any confidence in our ability to maneuver against our opponents. The British, meanwhile, already had experi­enced nearly two years of war in Europe. America’s military forces, while not yet actually engaged in open conflict, studied closely the lessons of the European battle and mod­ified their own military organizations accordingly. This experience would improve the position of our enemies, giving them an advantage in addition to their numerical supe­riority in military aircraft and in matériel. At best, our expeditions in China were of limited usefulness; we lacked battle experience against strong enemy air forces.

  We enjoyed one distinct strategic advantage. The air war in China had taught us clearly that the key to any suc­cessful military operation lay in command of the air. Without effective air control, our sea and land forces would at best be placed in disadvantageous positions and, indeed, might even forfeit victories which they could otherwise attain with adequate air power. It was also obvious, from past experience, that the primary means of attaining the coveted command of the air was through the possession of a superior fighter plane. Neither did we entertain any doubts that, in any large-scale protracted war in which planes and warships played the dominant roles, the outcome would depend largely on the basic national economy and our industrial potential.

  The secret document, Japanese Navy Wartime Organiz­ation Table, of which I was assigned a copy, listed the front- and second-line naval air strength at the war’s outset. As given in the document, this was:

  (Abbreviations are explained immediately below.)

  ABBREVIATIONS

  VF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fighter plane

  VB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .dive bomber

  VCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .carrier-based attack bomber

  VLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .land-based attack bomber

  VR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .land-based reconnaissance plane

  V2S . . . . . . . . . . . . . .two-seat scout-observation seaplane

  V3S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .three-seat scout seaplane

  VT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .trainer plane

  VST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .trainer seaplane

  VPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .patrol bomber (flying boat)

  BB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .battleship

  CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .heavy cruiser

  CL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .light cruiser

  CV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .aircraft carrier

  CVL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .light aircraft carrier

  Bat Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .battleship division

  Cru Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .cruiser division

  I. FIRST LINE STRIKING FORCE

  A. COMBINED FLEET

  From the preceding lists, I drew up a table of total aircraft types which would assist me in determining pilot and aircrew training program requirements, which stated:

  In the first-line striking force, all carrier-based dive bombers were Type 99’s; carrier-based attack bombers were Type 97’s; two-seat observation seaplanes were Type 95’s and Type Zeros; three-seat scout seaplanes were Type Zeros and some Type 94’s; and all flying boats were Type 97’s.

  Since we required two pilots to man each land-based attack bomber, flying boat, and transport plane listed in the above category, we needed a minimum of thirty-five hundred pilots merely to operate the Navy’s regular aircraft strength. This figure increased with the pilots required for the Navy’s auxiliary aircraft, which numbered one third the total of first- and second-line forces. At the very least, then, we required a total of nearly five thousand pilots, and an equal number of observers, navigators, gunners, bom­bardiers, radiomen, and other aircrew personnel to main­tain operational status with existing planes.

  We realized that the war with the United States and England would drain Japan’s limited resources, and that such attrition would create tremendous problems in the steady replacement of planes and matériel. I was fully aware, however, that our greatest weakness lay not in physical supplies, or in bulk manpower, but in the steady replacement of qualified flight crews. The difference between the veteran flier and the new pilot is far greater than is generally realized; one might compare the two to a man and a child.

  When I assumed my position in January of 1940 as an instructor at the Kasumigaura Training Air Corps, I learned that, despite the seeming low number of less than thirty-five hundred naval pilots, we actually maintained in active service a greater number of pilots than did the American Navy. At that time I was approached by Lieutenant Takekatsu Tanaka, my division officer, who felt concern for what he believed would surely be a future shortage of com­petent pilots. Farsighted and capable, and deeply con­cerned with the wellbeing of the Navy, Tanaka prepared and submitted to me for study his proposed “Plan for Training Fifteen Thousand Pilots.” Tanaka’s work and able consideration of training problems so impressed me that I forwarded the report with favorable recommendations to my immediate superior.

  In comparison to the then-existing Navy pilot training program, however, the number of pilots Tanaka proposed to train each year was so great that my superiors dismissed the recommendation merely as the wild dream of a young air force officer. It is regrettable that the “dream” was not afforded the attention it deserved. In August of 1941, when I was appointed as an air staff officer at Kasumigaura, the Navy circulated a new mass-training program which called for the special training of fifteen thousand pilots. World events, and the demands placed upon our naval air units, had changed so rapidly that accurate predictions became impossible. The Navy’s new training program came too late; it was impossible to train effectively the flight crew
s demanded by the Navy in the short space of time allowed.

  On that fateful morning of December 8, 1941, I felt that it was more than likely that, either quickly or through attrition, our shortage of pilots would result in victory for the United States and England. The mathematics were simple. Numerically, the Navy’s trained flight crews, i.e., those who had received operational “on-the-job” service following a year’s preliminary training, could not possibly man all the regular service aircraft listed in the Japanese Navy Wartime Organization Table, which I studied. Obvi­ously the greater majority of those pilots who were assigned to the spare planes were those who lacked even a full year’s training within the combat air corps. The overall figures hid further deficits in our manpower; many of our veteran pilots, then assigned to front-line combat units, could not possibly withstand the rigors of actual combat. A combination of age and ill health would effec­tively further reduce our ranks even before hostilities commenced.

  I realized intuitively that the percentage of pilots who lacked sufficient training, already a problem at the very outset of the war, would rapidly increase. We would not feel the effect of the proposed mass-training program for at least another two to four years.

  At the end of the first week in December of 1941 the Navy’s required training periods for student noncommis­sioned officer pilots were as follows:

  Noncommissioned Officer Pilot

  The Navy selected its air force officers from its lieutenants (J.G.) and ensigns, training these men for at least twelve months. These students were regarded as adequate pilots following a year of preliminary flight training in the combat air corps, but they required at least one additional year of training to qualify as carrier-based pilots and forward combat area pilots.