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  On November 22, 1941, while United States-Japanese diplomatic talks were under way, the Nagumo Force gath­ered at Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu Island, in the southern part of the Kuril Arch. All commanding officers assembled for special meetings with Admiral Nagumo, who took spe­cial pains to outline his plans for the attack, which would be launched should negotiations fail.

  At this time, no definite date for the assault was set. The final disposition and schedule for battle, should there be any, would be determined by the outcome of the diplo­matic maneuvers going on in the American capital.

  On November 26, according to plan, the warships and supporting vessels of the Nagumo Force weighed anchor and slipped out of Hitokappu Bay. Under strict secrecy, the task force set sail for its position north of Hawaii whence, should it prove necessary, the attack would be launched against Pearl Harbor. Admiral Yamamoto personally directed the sailing order to Admiral Nagumo.

  Even as the fleet made its way across the northern Pacific waters, the diplomatic negotiations in Washington foundered. The Japanese government felt that the worst possible international situation had resulted.

  On December 2, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto dispatched new orders to Admiral Nagumo: “The date for the declara­tion of war is fixed for December 8.”

  Upon receipt of his combat orders, Admiral Nagumo ordered the carrier task force to increase speed and to prepare for battle. Early on the morning of December 8 the attacking force reached its destination, approximately two hundred nautical miles north of Oahu Island.

  At 1:30 A.M., Tokyo time, the first bombers roared off their carrier decks, bound for Pearl Harbor.

  At exactly 3:23 A.M. (Tokyo time) on December 8, Com­mander Mitsuo Fuchida of the Akagi, supreme air com­mander of the Pearl Harbor Attack Air Groups, issued the following order to all his pilots in the air over or approach­ing Pearl Harbor: “All aircraft immediately attack enemy positions.” Commander Fuchida then sent a wireless report to Admiral Nagumo: “We have succeeded in the surprise attack.”

  These two wireless messages were the signals for rais­ing the curtain of war all across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Immediately thereafter Japanese air fleets launched their attacks against enemy installations over a front of thousands of miles.

  The fundamental rule of any air battle is to gain imme­diate control of the local air by eliminating the defensive activities of enemy fighter planes. This precept was rigidly adhered to in the Pearl Harbor attack.

  Under Commander Fuchida’s control, Lieutenant Akira Sakamoto led twenty-five Type 99 (Val) dive bombers of the first attacking wave in a screaming assault on Hoiler Air Base. Before the attack, Japanese intelligence had reported that Hoiler was the main center of American fighter-plane operations in Hawaii; Lieutenant Sakamoto’s mission was designed to eliminate fighter opposition before the American planes could leave the ground.

  Immediately behind Sakamoto’s group came twenty-six dive bombers under the command of Lieutenant Comman­der Kakuichi Takahashi. Takahashi’s planes swarmed over Hickam Air Field, which was reported to be the major heavy-bomber base for the enemy army air force; simulta­neously, a portion of the Takahashi attacking force was diverted for an attack against Ford Island. The latter was reported as a base for navy carrier fighter, and Takahashi’s attacking wave effectively shattered the enemy’s fighter strength.

  While a few enemy planes managed to get off the ground, our attacking aerial forces were relatively free from enemy fighter opposition, and our fleet was now pro­tected from an American aerial counterattack.

  As the dive bombers plunged from the sky, Commander Fuchida’s level and torpedo bombers assaulted the enemy battleships anchored in the harbor. Under Commander Fuchida’s direct control were forty-nine Type 97 carrier-based attack bombers; coordinated with this bombing effort was the torpedo bombing assault of forty Type 97 carrier-based attack bombers under the leadership of Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata.

  As the dive bombers, level bombers, and torpedo bombers carried out their attacks, Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya led forty-three Zero fighters in a low-level strafing sweep, shooting up enemy antiaircraft positions, ground installations, planes, and ships in the harbor. The Zeros intercepted and destroyed four enemy fighters which had managed to leave the ground during the attack and which were attempting to disrupt the bombing operations.

  One hour and fifteen minutes after the first attacking force ripped into the American naval bastion, the second wave of 170 aircraft under the command of Lieutenant Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki of the Zuikaku reached attack position above Oahu. Commander Shimazaki’s fifty-four level bombers pounded the enemy fighter and bomber air bases; immediately afterward Lieutenant Commander Takashige Egusa’s eighty dive bombers plunged earthward and sent their missiles into the anchored battleships and other enemy warships. Thirty-six Zero fighters led by Lieutenant Saburo Shindo in a combination strafing and air-strike mission swept the air clear of opposing enemy fight­ers and carried out strafing attacks against their air bases.

  By approximately 8:30 A.M. all our planes had com­pleted their attacks and had returned to their respective aircraft carriers.

  Chief Flight Petty Officer Juzo Mori of the Soryu flew the second torpedo bomber in the attack led by Lieutenant Tsuyoshi Nagai; this is Juzo Mori’s story:

  “The assigned objectives of the Soryu torpedo bombers were the American battleships which we expected to find anchored along the wharf of the Oahu Naval Arsenal. We dropped in for our attack at high speed and low altitude and, when I was almost in position to release my own tor­pedo, I realized that the enemy warship toward which I was headed was not a battleship at all, but a cruiser. My flight position was directly behind Lieutenant Nagai, and we flew directly over Oahu Island before descending for our attack.

  “Lieutenant Nagai continued his torpedo run against the cruiser, despite our original plan to attack the enemy battleships. However, I did not expect to survive this attack, since I and all the other pilots anticipated heavy enemy resistance. If I were going to die, I thought, I wanted to know that I had torpedoed at least an American battleship.

  “The attack of the Soryu’s planes was met with intense antiaircraft fire from the enemy fleet, since the bombing waves from the Akagi and the Kaga had already passed over. My bomber shook and vibrated from the impact of enemy machinegun bullets and shrapnel. Despite my intention of swinging away from the cruiser, now dead ahead of my plane, and attacking the group of battleships anchored near Ford Island, I was forced to fly directly forward into a murderous rain of antiaircraft fire.

  “Because of this and the surrounding topography, I flew directly over the enemy battleships along Ford Island, and then banked into a wide left turn. The antiaircraft fire did not seem to affect the plane’s performance, and I chose as my new objective a battleship anchored some distance from the main group of vessels which were at the moment undergoing torpedo attack from the Soryu’s planes. The warship separated from the main enemy group appeared to be the only battleship yet undamaged.

  “I swung low and put my plane into satisfactory torpe­doing position. It was imperative that my bombing approach be absolutely correct, as I had been warned that the harbor depth was no more than thirty-four feet. The slightest deviation in speed or height would send the released torpedo plunging into the sea bottom, or jumping above the water, and all our effort would go for naught.

  “By this time I was hardly conscious of what I was doing. I was reacting from habit instilled by long training, moving like an automaton.

  “Three thousand feet! Twenty-five hundred feet! Two thousand feet!

  “Suddenly the battleship appeared to have leaped forward directly in front of my speeding plane; it towered ahead of the bomber like a great mountain peak.

  “Prepare for release. . . . Stand by!

  “Release torpedo!

  “All this time I was oblivious of the enemy’s antiaircraft fire and the distracting thunder of my plane’s mo
tor. I con­centrated on nothing but the approach and the torpedo release. At the right moment I pulled back on the release with all my strength. The plane lurched and faltered as antiaircraft struck the wings and fuselage; my head snapped back and I felt as though a heavy beam had struck against my head.

  “But . . . I’ve got it! A perfect release!

  “And the plane is still flying! The torpedo will surely hit its target; the release was exact. At that instant I seemed to come to my senses and became aware of my position and of the flashing tracers and shells of the enemy’s defensive batteries.

  “After launching the torpedo, I flew directly over the enemy battleship and again swung into a wide, circling turn. I crossed over the southern tip of Ford Island.

  “To conceal the position of our carrier, as we had been instructed to do, I turned again and took a course due south, directly opposite the Soryu’s true position, and pushed the plane to its maximum speed.

  “Now that the attack was over, I was acutely conscious that the enemy antiaircraft fire was bracketing and smash­ing into my bomber. The enemy shells appeared to be coming from all directions, and I was so frightened that before I left the target area my clothes were soaking with perspiration.

  “In another few moments the air was clear. The enemy shells had stopped. Thinking that now I had safely escaped, and could return to the carrier, I began to turn to head back to the Soryu. Suddenly there was an enemy plane directly in front of me!

  “As my plane, the Type 97 carrier-based attack bomber, was armed only with a single rearward-firing 7.7-mm. machine gun, it was almost helpless in aerial combat. I thought that surely this time my end had come.

  “As long as I was going to die, I reasoned, I would take the enemy plane with me to my death. I swung the bomber over hard and headed directly for the enemy aircraft, the pilot of which appeared startled at my maneuver, and fled! Is this really, I questioned, what is called war?”

  ***

  At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese naval air force had attained what was probably the world’s high­est rate of accuracy in level-bombing aircraft attacks, including the use of conventional aerial bombs and of aer­ial torpedoes. The credit for such outstanding accuracy of bomb and torpedo hits as was dramatically illustrated at Pearl Harbor, as well as in the sea battle off Malaya two days later, belongs largely to Admiral Yamamoto.

  During the period 1939–1940 the accuracy of Japanese level bombers was incredibly poor. It was so bad that it was doubtful whether one hit could be achieved when three or four groups of nine-plane formations released their bombs from a height of ten thousand feet against an evading battleship-size target on the open sea.

  On the other hand, an attack by three dive bombers against the same type of objective almost always guaran­teed at least one successful hit on target. High official cir­cles were of the opinion that, for attacking warships, dive bombing and torpedoing were the preferred methods of attack. The feeling that level bombing should be eliminated entirely dominated the Navy’s airpower hierarchy.

  At this time Admiral Yamamoto took an active hand in the development of bombing techniques. Recently made Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet (he was a Vice-Admiral then), Yamamoto firmly declared:

  “As long as I am the Commander in Chief of the Com­bined Fleet, I will not do away with level bombing. True, our level bombing accuracy at sea has been poor, but the reason for the poor ratio of bomb hits lies in the free, eva­sive movement of the target vessel. There is no reason compelling us to select only these difficult targets. At any rate, I hope that much further study and practice will be conducted hereafter. . . .”

  Admiral Yamamoto had also issued the order to pursue and destroy, either at the Singapore Naval Base or on the high seas, the British fleet which was, at the time of the Hawaiian Operation, somewhere in the Malaya area. As will be related in later pages, our naval air force in this the­ater, under far greater operating difficulties and hazards than were encountered at Pearl Harbor, accomplished a mission no less vital than the Pearl Harbor attack.

  The fighters and bombers of the Nagumo Force which attacked Pearl Harbor fought brilliantly and heroically; within a very short space of time they destroyed the major strength of the United States Pacific Fleet. In this operation our losses consisted of nine Zero fighters; fifteen Type 99 carrier-based dive bombers; five Type 97 carrier-based attack bombers; and fifty-five officers and men. Among the casualties were Lieutenant Saburo Makino, group leader of the Kaga’s dive bombers, and Lieutenant Fusata Iida, squadron leader of Zero fighters from the Soryu.

  Lieutenant Iida participated in the Pearl Harbor attack as the leader of the 3rd Covering Fighter Squadron, com­posed of nine Zero fighters, which struck in the second attacking wave. Near the Kaneohe Air Field his squadron, with the aid of accompanying fighter units, intercepted five or six enemy planes and quickly destroyed them all. They then strafed the air field, shooting up all enemy aircraft in sight. Lieutenant (JG) Iyozo Fujita, who partici­pated with Lieutenant Iida in the attack as the second section leader, relates what happened to Lieutenant Iida’s plane during the assault:

  “When our planes machine-gunned the airfield at Kaneohe, I looked for but failed to see any antiaircraft guns on the field. Later, however, when all the fighters assem­bled their formations over the field I noticed a white spray of gasoline shooting out from Lieutenant Iida’s plane. There appeared to be no other damage to his fighter, and I assumed he would be able to return to the carrier.

  “Such was not the case, however. Lieutenant Iida cir­cled over the Kaneohe Air Field until he was sure that all our fighters were assembled in formation. Then, and only then, he closed his cockpit canopy and began to descend toward the airfield. Suddenly the Zero whipped over into an inverted position and dove vertically for the enemy positions below.

  “Thinking that he was going to make another strafing run on the field, I immediately began a wingover to follow his plane down. I realized abruptly, however, that Lieutenant Iida was flying in a most unusual manner, quite dif­ferent from his usual tactics. I watched his plane as it dove in its vertical, inverted position until it exploded on the ground between the Kaneohe airfield hangars.”

  Thus died one of Japan’s leading fighter pilots on the first day of the war. Lieutenant Iida had flown as a Zero fighter pilot since September of 1939, and had fought successfully against Chinese fighters over the Asiatic mainland. He was twenty-seven years old when he died, and was the highest ranking officer among the Nagumo Force’s fighter pilots to die this day.

  (After the war I [Okumiya] had the opportunity carefully to review the American photographs of the Pearl Har­bor attack. In one picture I saw the funeral ceremony at Pearl Harbor of an air force lieutenant of the Japanese Navy. It was not possible to discern from the photographs any difference in the burial services afforded the American dead and those given the Japanese lieutenant. I point this out especially, since those Americans were killed because of a Japanese air attack in which this Japanese lieutenant participated. We—all former Japanese airmen—should take heed of this fact, and long remember the attitude of the American officers and men who did not make any discrim­ination between their own and the enemy’s officers, even after such an event as the Pearl Harbor attack.)

  Following the final assault against the enemy installa­tions at Hawaii, Commander Fuchida, the supreme air commander of the operation, returned safely to his aircraft carrier with the second attack force. Lieutenant Masaharu Suganami, group leader of the Soryu’s Zero fighters, left his carrier at 1:30 A.M. when the Japanese fleet was still two hundred nautical miles north of Oahu; after convoying the bombers of the first attacking wave and strafing the enemy’s airfield, he remained alone over Oahu Island and joined the second attack group in its assault. He returned to his carrier at approximately 8:30 A.M.

  From such incidents we can well appreciate the high quality and air-combat superiority of the officers and men of the Nagumo Force. T
his was their first introduction to airsea combat on a large scale, and the men and planes accomplished their tasks magnificently.

  Thus ended successfully the greatest aerial operation ever seen up to this time. In a single smashing blow a total of 353 planes from six aircraft carriers completely wrecked the powerful battleship fleet of the United States. This feat astounded the entire world.

  Who would have thought, up to this time, that the Japanese Navy, without firing a single shot from its guns, would be able to destroy almost completely and within so short a time the powerful dreadnaughts of the United States Pacific Fleet? The battleship had long been regarded as the king of the sea. Ever since the birth of the modern navy, the battleship had reigned supreme in America’s fleet. And this same fleet which, with only eight battle-ships, had been holding the Japanese Navy at a distance of more than three thousand nautical miles, now lay crushed and useless as the result of a single telling air blow!

  What is most amazing about the Hawaiian Operation is that, of the 353 planes launched by the Nagumo Force to attack Pearl Harbor, only 154 planes were assigned to attack the American warships. The remaining 199 aircraft were dispatched to strafe and bomb the enemy airfields, to destroy on the ground and in the air any enemy aircraft, the attacking Japanese force might have undisputed local air superiority.

  If the American air force had detected in advance the approach of the Japanese fighters and bombers and had thrown up an air defense of fighter planes, our accomplish­ments would surely have been lessened and our losses increased. It is conceivable that, had Pearl Harbor been protected by air defenses, the assault against Hawaii could have lost much of its effectiveness, and the nature of the Pacific War proportionally altered.